January Lectures at the Royal Institute

Talks this month in the London Lecture Series:

18th – JUSTIN BROACKES: “Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil”

25th – RACHAEL WISEMAN: “Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs”

I will present and defends Anscombe’s answer to the question: How do you get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’? My aim is to show how conceiving of the subject-matter of philosophy of psychology as the study of forms of thought and not thoughts (mind not minds, as Frege put it) enables us to bridge the is/ought gap in ethics. The talk will illuminate the connection between Anscombe’s enquiry in Intention and her controversial thesis (in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’) that the concept of moral obligation ought to be jettisoned.

There is a full programme here.